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Decisions of International and Foreign Tribunals
RENi H. HIMEL, JR., Departmental Editor

RHODESIA
The irregular situation in Rhodesia has given rise to two interesting
recent judgements, one by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Madzimbamuto i. Lardner-Burke, and a later decision by the
Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia in Ndhlovu v. The
Queen.
The Madzibamuto case involved the validity of the detention of
the appellant's husband pursuant to an order made by the respondent
Minister of Justice of Rhodesia in 1966. The majority judgement
delivered by Lord Reid on July 23, 1968, summarized the history of
British Rhodesia, pointing out that the territory was acquired by
conquest by the British South Africa Company on behalf of the Crown;
that in 1923 the territory was formally annexed to His Majesty's
Dominions as the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, and a Legislative
Assembly was established therein; that by 1961 it had become an
established convention for the British Parliament not to legislate for
Southern Rhodesia in matters within the competence of the Legislative
Assembly except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia
Government; that in 1961 Her Majesty granted to Southern Rhodesia,
pursuant to Parliamentary authorization, a Constitutional vesting
executive authority in the Crown to be exercised by a Governor and
through a Prime Minister and other Ministers, all holding office at Her
Majesty's pleasure; the Constitution contained a Declaration of Rights
forbiding unlawful detentions, which is not subject to amendment by
the Rhodesian Legislature; that on November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian
Cabinet issued a unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern
Rhodesia, and a new Constitution, which was subsequently adopted by
the Rhodesian Legislature and which the Governor, pursuant to British
authorization, then removed the Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers from
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office; that on November 16, 1965, the British Parliament passed the
Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which delcares that "Southern Rhodesia
continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions" and authorizes Her
Majesty to make Orders in Council in relation to Southern Rhodesia;
that pursuant to the Act, the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order
1965 was made, declaring null the new Constitution adopted in
Rhodesia and all official business thereafter transacted by the Rhodesian Legislature; that the Rhodesian Cabinet and Legislature ignored the
latter order and the removal of the Cabinet Ministers; and that the 1966
order for detention of the appellant's husband was made pursuant to
Emergency Regulations adopted by the Rhodesian Government pursuant to the 1965 Constitution.
The Rhodesian Court a qua held that the 1965 Constitution was
invalid and the Rhodesian Government not a lawful government, but
justified the Emergency Regulations on the basis of necessity, the
Government being the only effective government of the country.
The appellant's appeal was denied by the Appellate Division of the
High Court of Rhodesia, on the ground that the government, being the
only effective one, was a de facto, and perhaps an "internal de jure"
government whose acts should be given legal effect, at least to the
extent that they do not infringe the 1961 Constitution.
Being of the opinion that the Privy Council has no further
jurisdiction over appeals from the High Court of Rhodesia, the
Rhodesian Government was unrepresented in the appellant's appeal to
the Privy Council. It is understood that an amicus curiae participate to
present considerations favoring the Government's views.
The Privy Council first determined that the question of British
sovereignty in Rhodesia had to be decided on principles of English
constitutional law, not Roman Dutch Law internally applicable in
Rhodesia.
On the merits, their Lordships were of the opinion that, Southern
Rhodesia being a British colony, the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom Parliament therein was supreme and undiminished by the
limited grant of self-government; that the convention of non-legislation
by the United Kingdom Parliament on matters within the competence
of the Legislative Assembly without the consent of the Rhodesian
Government "had no legal effect in limiting the legal power of
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Parliament"; that, while disregard of this convention might have been
considered unconstitutional in the sense that it would have been
improper for Parliament to do so, nevertheless the courts are concerned
only with the legal power; and that in any event the unilateral
Declaration of Independence could be considered as having released
Parliament from any obligation to observe the convention.
Their Lordships felt that the distinction between de jure and de
facto governments, while sometimes useful diplomatically, is inappropriate to a judicial decision as to the legal position of a usurper. The
only question in such a case is whether the new regime has reached the
stage of legitimacy, to be determined with reference to "the efficacy of
the change"; and this cannot be said to have occured in Rhodesia, since
the British Government is taking steps to regain control and it is
impossible to predict with certainty whether or not it will succeed.
Referring to the Statute of 1495 exempting from penalty

''persons ...that attend upon the King and Sovereign lord of this land

for the time being," their Lordships quoted Blackstone's explanation
that the statute "does by no means command any opposition to a king
de jure; but excuses the obedience paid to a king de facto," and held
that it did not enact a general rule that a usurping government in
control must be regarded as a lawful government.
Considering the argument of necessity, their Lordships referred to
American decisions sustaining the validity of acts of the Confederate
States during the Civil War; these were distinguished on the grounds
that there is divided internal sovereignty in the United States, that the
cases involved determination of private rights not the legality of
governments, and that Congress had not enacted laws similar to the
Southern Rhodesia Act and the Order in Council of 1965 setting forth
the legal position in the Confederate States during the war.
Their Lordships recognized that in a legal vacuum, the acts of
sovereignty of a usurper might be accorded the recognition required for
preservation of law and order, but pointed out that no such situation
existed in Rhodesia, in light of the 1965 Act, and Orders made
pursuant thereto, as well as pre-existing legislation not impaired
thereby.
Lord Pearce handed down a dissenting judgement based on the
doctrine of necessity. He cited the American Civil-War decisions holding
that the acts of the Confederate State Governments were valid so long
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 3
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as they were not in furtherance or support of the rebellion against, or
hostile to the authority of, the Federal Government and did not impair
rights under the Federal Constitution. He also referred to two directives
issued by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia after the unilateral
Declaration of Independence, calling on the people, expressly including
the judiciary, "to maintain law and order in this country and to carry
on with their normal tasks"; and pointed out that, absent any other
effective governmental authority, the judiciary had no choice but to act
under the authority of the existing Rhodesian Government. He stated
his view that the action of a de facto government could not be
considered to impair a citizen's constitutional rights unless the same
action by lawful authorities would be so considered. [19631 3 All E.R.
561.
In the Ndhlovu case, decided on September 13, 1968, the
Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia reached a conclusion
directly contrary to that of the Privy Council. The appellants were
charged with violating a Rhodesian statute enacted in 1967. They
excepted to the indictment of the contention that under the 1965
Order in Council the legislature of Rhodesia was unable to enact valid
laws thereafter. The Appellate Division dismissed their appeal from the
trial judge's action in overruling the'exception.
Chief Justice Beadle adopted the position that it is now "certain"
(in the sense of "proof sufficient to carry conviction to a reasonable
mind") that the British Government will not succeed in regaining
control of the Government of Rhodesia, and that under the accepted
test of whether a de facto government has, following its abolition of a
prior constitution, become de jure - "the efficacy of the change" - the
present Government of Rhodesia is de jure and the 1961 Constitution
has been abolished by the unilateral Declaration of Independence.
The Chief Justice based his conclusion on the facts that the
present government has been firmly in control for over three years, that
the effectiveness of its control is evidenced by its repeal last April of
the censorship regulations imposed after the Declaration of Independence, that the government is maintaining a balanced budget without
increasing taxation, that no candidates opposing independence have
contested recent by-elections, and that while existing economic
sanctions are having an adverse effect on the country's economy, there
is no reason to suppose that they will induce such an economic collapse
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as could cause the Government to capitulate or the people to rise
against it.
The Chief Justice recognized the anomalous position in which he
and his colleagues found themselves, as judges appointed under a
constitution which they held to have been abolished. His conclusion
was that in such a situation, judges legally may and ethically should
continue to sit, but under the authority of the superseding regime.
Justice Quenet, in his opinion, pointed out that the Privy Council
was bound, in deciding the Madzimbamuto case, by the decision of its
own Government as to the status of Rhodesia, whereas the Rhodesian
court had to make its own independent determination of the question.
He concurred with the Chief Justice that the present Rhodesian
government has achieved "internal de jure status."
Justice Macdonald began his aggressive opinion with a reference to
assurances made by the British Government in 1962 that they could
not revoke or amend the 1961 Constitution. He pointed out that the
Privy Council, as part of the British constitutional system, may not,
without precipitating a major constitutional crisis, declare an Act of
Parliament invalid, and was therefore bound to give effect to the 1965
Order in Council. Justice Macdonald went on to say that while in
abstract legal theory, Parliament has power to annul the constitutions
of former British colonies or dominions, such power does not exist as a
matter of constitutional reality, and that the Privy Council had itself
said as much with reference to Canada in British Coal Corporation v.
the King, [1935] AC 500.
Justice Macdonald stated that, when faced with the unilateral
Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian Cabinet, the British
Government could constitutionally have appointed cabinet ministers in
place of those thereupon dismissed by the Governor; but that, not
having taken this step, the British Government could not rightly expect
the Rhodesian people to acquiesce in the unconstitutional step of
annulment of the 1961 Constitution.
Justice Macdonald took the position that since 1965 the British
Government has in effect been waging economic war against Rhodesia
instead of trying to govern it, thereby penalizing the entire Rhodesian
people for the action of the Cabinet, and that by this action and by its
effective abdication to the United Nations of its responsibility for
settling the matter, the British Government had forfeited "not only
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respect and authority but also all claim to allegiance," citing Grotius De
Jure Belli et Pacis, Book I, Cap. IV.
BRITISH HONDURAS MEDIATIONS
Ambassador Bethuel M. Webster's proposed treaty for settlement
of the dispute between the United Kingdom and Guatemala over British
Honduras has been rejected by the Governments of both the United
Kingdom and British Honduras. The disputing governments had asked
the United States to mediate the dispute as a prelude to independence
of British Honduras in 1971. After more than two years of discussion
and study, Ambassador Webster's proposal was submitted on April 18,
1968. 7 International Legal Materials 626.
Apparently the opposition National Independence Party in British
Honduras took the occasion to stir up political unrest on the assertion
that the proposed treaty involved an agreement by the Government
People's United Party to subordinate British Honduras to Guatemala
after independence. At all events, on Premier Price's motion, the draft
treaty was rejected by the British Honduras House of Representatives
on May 16, and perforce by the United Kingdom, which was
committed not to accept a solution unacceptable to British Honduras.
Guatemala had also indicated dissatisfaction with the proposal.
The draft treaty (prepared for execution by Guatemala and the
United Kingdom with subsequent accession by independent British
Honduras), while vesting full sovereignty in Belize (the new name of
independent British Honduras) after independence, would have given
Belize and Guatemala important reciprocal tax and duty-free transit
rights in each other's territories and ports, would have established a
right of unrestricted travel (and perhaps residence) by Belizeans and
Guatemalans in the two countries without passports, visa or (apparently) quota or other restrictions, provided for construction of a road
as an effective link between Belize and Honduras, and accorded
educational degrees and governmental documents of each country the
same recognition in the other.
The proposed treaty contemplated, without requiring, Belize's
entry into the Central American Common Market (with phase-out of its
Commonwealth tariff status) and other institutions and treaties of the
Central American community.
Consultation and cooperation between Belize and Guatemala as to
internal security and foreign policy were stipulated, as well as
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conclusion of "arrangements concerning matters of external defense of
mutual concern," including defense of the approaches to and the
security of Belize and the use of Belizean ports by Guatemalan naval
units when requested to assist Belize. On request, Guatemala was to
handle all aspects of Belize's international relations.
The treaty provided for a Joint Consultative Committee to
consider matters of external defense of mutual interest, as well as a
seven-member Authority (three from each country and a seventh
appointed by the other six or by the United States) to oversee
implementation of the treaty.
It is understood that English and Belizean opponents of the treaty
feared that it might provide a framework for de facto domination of
Belize by its larger and more powerful neighbor.
INDIA
The Rann of Kutch boundary award between India and Pakistan
was reported in the last issue of The International Lawyer. On May 14,
1968, the High Court of Delhi dismissed three Civil Writ Petitions filed
to restrain implementation of the award. The petitioners argued that
implementation of the award, by alignment of the boundary in
question, would constitute a cession of Indian territory requiring an
amendment to the constitution. Accepting the Government's positon,
the court held that the award did not grant Indian territory to Pakistan
but merely determined the boundary between the two countries, the
determination entailing a decision as to ownership of the territory on
either side of the boundary. 8 Indian Journal of International Law 267.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 3

